Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide, Euthanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs by Stradley, Belinda
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 5
January 1985
Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide,
Euthanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs
Belinda Stradley
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Belinda Stradley, Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide, Euthanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs, 15 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1985).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/5
ELIZABETH BOUVIA v. RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL: SUICIDE, EUTHANASIA, 
MURDER: THE LINE BLURS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 1983, the California Superior Court was pre-
sented with a question of first impression. In a case which at-
tracted considerable media attention, Elizabeth Bouvia v. River-
side Hospital, l the court was asked to decide whether it should 
authorize the state to assist a physically disabled person to com-
mit suicide. This question arose after Elizabeth Bouvia, who is 
physically disabled,2 arranged for voluntary psychiatric admis-
sion to Riverside Hospital. She subsequently disclosed her in-
tent to stop eating, and thereby die by starvation. She requested 
that hospital staff provide her with pain medication and hy-
gienic care until she died. She stated that she no longer wished 
to live because of her disability, and that because of her disabil-
ity, she was physically unable to commit suicide. 
Shortly thereafter, Riverside informed Bouvia that when 
her body weight fell below a certain level, steps would be taken 
to force-feed her.s Bouvia sought and obtained counsel· to avoid 
such action. She filed a petition for Temporary Restraining Or-
der and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction in the California 
1. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 1983). 
2. Elizabeth Bouvia, 26 years old, was born with cerebral palsy (CP), a non-progres-
sive condition, which in her case affects ability to control motor movements. She requires 
assistance in bathing, dressing, and the eating of most foods. She utilizes an electric 
wheelchair for mobility. She experiences pain as a result of arthritis. She has lived both 
in institutional settings, and in ordinary housing with the assistance of attendants. She 
has a bachelor's degree in social work. As of the time of this action, she had been unable 
to obtain employment in her field. 
3. Riverside cited as authority for such action the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of 
1967, CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5150 (West 1984), which provides that a person may be 
temporarily detained for evaluation and treatment when he or she, "as a result of mental 
disorder, is a danger to others, or to [her) himself .... " Force-feeding is accomplished 
through use of a nasogastric tube, i.e., a tube which is inserted through the nose into the 
stomach, through which nutrients are delivered. 
4. Bouvia was represented by Richard Scott, in collaboration with the American 
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Superior Court, requesting that the Court enjoin Riverside from 
force-feeding her or discharging her from the hospital,5 In a de-
cision outlined below, the hospital was enjoined from discharg-
ing Bouvia against her will, but her request to enjoin force-feed-
ing was denied. That denial was stayed until January 1984 to 
permit application for appellate relief.6 In December 1983, Riv-
erside staff determined that Bouvia's physical condition from 
starvation constituted a medical emergency. The hospital conse-
quently sought and was granted a temporary restraining order to 
force-feed her. Force-feeding continued until Bouvia checked 
out of Riverside early in 1984. Her admission had at all times 
been voluntary. The California Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion7 for hearing on the substantive controversy of her case.S As 
of the date of this writing, plans to appeal her denied injunction 
have been dropped. 
This Note will address the issues as they were presented to 
the court, analyze the court's decision, and in so doing explore 
the potential social and legal ramifications of a contrary result. 
II. ARGUMENTS AND DECISION 
A. Summary of Plaintiff's Arguments 
Central to the plaintiff's case was the thesis that a funda-
mental right exists to terminate one's own life. Some individuals, 
she asserted, are not able to commit suicide because of a physi-
cal disability which prevents them from being able to manually 
control the means. These individuals require assistance to exer-
cise this fundamental right.9 Bouvia asserted that she was physi-
cally unable to commit suicide, and therefore, intended to die by 
5. Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunc-
tions Against Violations of Civil Rights to Privacy, Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 
(Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 1983). 
6. [d. at 1248-49. 
7. Petition for Hearing, Bouvia v. Superior Court, No.4 Civ. 33225 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 
filed Dec. 1983). 
8. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1983, § 6 at 1, col. 16. California Supreme Court refused to 
hear emergency appeal from order and to block hospital from discharging her. 
9. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities to California Superior Court in Sup-
port of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent 
Injunction, Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780, at 8-36 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 
1983). 
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starvation. She requested that she be allowed to remain in the 
hospital without being force-fed, in order to be provided with 
pain medication and hygenic care until she succumbed to 
starvation. 
Because of her physical disability, Bouvia argued, the denial 
of such assistance was in effect to deny her fundamental right to 
terminate her life. Such denial of assistance and therefore denial 
of a fundamental right, solely because an individual is not physi-
cally able to exercise that right without assistance, amounts to 
discrimination on the basis of disability. The foundation of 
Bouvia's case, then, rested on the allegation that Riverside's ac-
tion violated federal and state statutes which prohibit discrimi-
nation on this basis.10 In support, the petition addressed four 
pivotal issues. 
1. Refusal of Unwanted Medical Treatment 
Bouvia argued that the assistance she required to eat, i.e., 
someone other than herself lifting food from plate to mouth, 
constituted medical treatment. As a competent adult, she had a 
right to refuse such treatment. Citing Cobbs v. Grant,!1 Bouvia 
asserted the generally recognized principal that all competent 
adults, without minor dependents, have the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, even if such refusal results in their death. 
2. Suicide 
Anticipating the hospital's argument that voluntary starva-
tion constituted suicide, Bouvia's counsel drew an analogy be-
tween a refusal to accept assistance in eating (as well as nutri-
tion through nasogastric tube), and the decision of an individual 
to forego life-sustaining kidney dialysis treatment. The latter 
could, of course, refuse such medical treatment under Cobbs, ir-
respective of the existence of an underlying fatal illness. While a 
patient receiving dialysis treatment is not usually terminally ill 
while supported by that treatment, he or she will die if treat-
ment is discontinued. 
10. Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 11135 
(West 1976). 
11. 8 Cal. App. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). 
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Similarly in Bouvia's case, counsel contended, her disability 
would become terminal if she refused to accept assistance from 
others in activities that she could not otherwise accomplish un-
aided, i.e., bringing most kinds of food items to her mouth. 
Hence, like the dialysis candidate who refused dialysis, "peti-
tioner is not committing suicide ... "12 when she chooses not to 
seek or accept assistance in eating. 
3. Right to Privacy 
Bouvia's petition found further support in the explicit right 
of privacy in the California Constitution. Counsel contended 
that such constitutional right to privacy includes the right to 
freedom of choice and self-determination of medical treatment. 
Thus, Bouvia's fundamental right of privacy was violated by not 
allowing her to refuse medical treatment, i.e., to refuse assis-
tance in eating, or force-feeding. 
4. Application of Suicide Statute 
A major concern of the hospital was possible criminalliabil-
ity. Under California law, a person who "aids, or advises, or en-
courages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony."ls 
Bouvia contended that refusing to be fed was not committing 
suicide but rather exercising her fundamental rights. Providing 
her with care during starvation would not be aiding in an act of 
suicide, but instead would merely be giving her standard medi-
cal care while she succumbed to the natural result of her 
disability. 
B. Summary of Defendant's Arguments 
Riverside Hospital asserted that Bouvia did not have the 
right to end her life, by virtue of any statutory, constitutional, 
ethical or moral theory.14 In the alternative, even if Bouvia did 
have such a right, it was overridden by compelling state interests 
12. Petition for Hearing, Bouvia v. Superior Court, Riverside County No. 4 Civ. 
33225 at 26 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. I, 1983). 
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1976). 
14. Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities, Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. River. filed Dec. 16, 1983). 
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in the preservation of life, and in the prevention of suicide. 
In addition to these state interests, the hospital claimed 
that to allow and assist Bouvia to die within hospital confines 
would have a devastating effect on the medical staff and admin-
istration at Riverside Hospital. A number of staff had expressed 
their unwillingness to participate in Bouvia's dying process, cit-
ing medical ethics, which require that a hospital staff do every-
thing possible to save and prolong life. 
The hospital argued that to allow Bouvia to die within the 
hospital would have a debilitating effect on patients in the hos-
pital. There is an inherent contradiction in assisting one person 
to die while attempting to work with other persons close by who 
were experiencing life crises, some of whom may have attempted 
suicide. The court was convinced that if they granted Bouvia's 
request, it would have a devastating effect on other patients at 
Riverside. 
Moreover, the hospital argued that to grant Bouvia's wishes 
would amount to participation in the crimes of murder, conspir-
acy, and aiding and abetting suicide. To assist her in these acts 
would not only subject the county to criminal and civil liability, 
but would result in censure from the licensing authority of the 
hospital, its doctors and its nurses. 
c. Superior Court Decision 
Judge Hews issued the court's decision on December 16, 
1983, denying plaintiff's request for preliminary and permanent 
injunctions. 1Ii The court determined that the ultimate issue was 
"whether or not a severely handicapped, mentally competent 
person who is otherwise physically healthy and not terminally ill 
has the right to end her life with the assistance of society."ls 
The court concluded that she did not.17 
The court based its decision entirely on the constitutional 
issues presented, i.e., the right to privacy and self-determination 
15. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 1983). 
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recognized under the first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 1 
of the California Constitution.18 
The court concluded that the plaintiff did have a funda-
mental or preferred right to terminate her own life and refuse 
medical intervention,19 but not while she was not terminal, and 
not with the assistance of society. Those fundamental rights 
were overcome by strong state and societal interests.2o 
The strongest state interest cited was preservation of life.21 
The court made a factual determination that Bouvia was not 
terminal.lII Further, plaintiff's counsel showed no legal precedent 
for the notion that a non-terminal person with a disabling but 
non-progressive physical condition should be allowed to termi-
nate his or her life because of a sincere desire to do so by reason 
of the disability.28 
The next state interest cited was prevention of suicide.24 
While plaintiff's cerebral palsy was not terminal, the court rea-
soned, "self-starvation with the assistance of society would 
be."211 The California Natural Death Act26 authorizes persons to 
direct that further medical care be withheld following a determi-
nation that death is imminent. The court found that "[t]he Act 
does not permit any affirmative act or omission to end life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying."27 The court deter-
mined that plaintiff was not a qualified patient under this Act,28 
as her death as proposed would not be "natural,"29 but would be 
18.Id. 
19.Id. 
20. [d. at 1247. 
21. [d. at 1245. 
22. [d. at 1242. 
23. Id. at 1245. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. 
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1976). 
27. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1247 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 
1983). 
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(0 "Terminal condition" is defined as "an 
incurable condition caused by injury, disease or illness which, regardless of the applica-
tion of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable judgment, produce death, 
and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the mo-
ment of death of the patient." 
29. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1246 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 
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voluntary starvation. Logically, the court reasoned, it would be 
the result of suicide.30 The court further determined that 
whether or not forcing nutrients was termed medical treatment 
was not outcome-determinative under the factual setting, since 
the case could be decided on state interest grounds. SI Therefore, 
forced-feeding of an otherwise non-terminal patient was 
permissible. S2 
The court cited the state interest in maintenance of the in-
tegrity of the medical profession. ss While it is recognized that 
the dying are often more in need of comfort than of treatment, S4 
the court noted that plaintiff was not dying. Established ethics 
of the medical profession clearly outweighed and overcame her 
rights of self-determination, according to the court.SG 
The court also considered the interests of third parties. 
Those parties included other patients in Riverside Hospital, as 
well as similarly situated physically handicapped persons in the 
United States. It was the opinion of the court that the interest 
of these third parties would be adversely affected by granting 
plaintiff's request for an injunction. S6 
The court made the following factual findings in arriving at 
a decision: (1) plaintiff was mentally competent to make deci-
sions affecting her life; her decision was reached primarily be-
cause of the nature and extent of her disability, and not because 
of recent experiences such as non-employment, miscarriage, and 
a failed marriage,S7 (2) plaintiff was not terminal; cerebral palsy 
is not a progressive disabilityS8 because all of plaintiff's bodily 
systems were fully functional,s9 (3) plaintiff was physically una-
ble to take her own life; her mind and intellect were normal,40 
(4) to grant plaintiff's request would have a profound adverse 
1983). 
30.Id. 
31. Id. at 1248. 
32. Id. at 1247. 
33. Id. at 1246. 
34.Id. 
3S.Id. 
36. Id. at 1243. 
37. Id. at 1242. 
38.Id. 
39. Id. at 1243. 
40. Id. at 1241. 
7
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effect on the medical staff, nurses, administration, and patients 
of Riverside General Hospital,41 and (5) such an order would 
have an adverse effect on other similarly situated handicapped 
persons.'2 
III. ANALYSIS 
The main question the court considered was whether to 
grant the state authority to assist a physically disabled person to 
commit suicide.'8 This Note undertakes to demonstrate that a 
negative answer is mandated. Given the negative stereotypes 
widely held about disability, such a decision would put a judicial 
stamp of approval on these stereotypes, thereby reinforcing and 
perpetuating them. In addition, the policy behind penal sanc-
tions against assisting persons to commit suicide is applicable to 
persons with or without disabilities, and an exception to the rule 
should not be granted solely on the basis of disability. Finally, 
plaintiff's analysis of the purpose and application of section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1983 is erroneous; section 504 is not 
applicable to this case. 
A. History of Negative Stereotyping and Exclusion 
In order to appreciate the significance of a ruling in favor of 
Bouvia, and the judicial stamp of approval it would represent, it 
is necessary to examine the evolution of societal attitudes about 
disability. That evolution is still in progress, but many of the 
underlying themes in the historical treatment of persons with 
disabilities are prevalent today. An awareness of these recurring 
themes is critical to an understanding of the influence they may 
have on court decisions that can reinforce societal attitudes 
about disabled persons. 
Prejudice against disabled persons reaches far back in his-
tory." In colonial times, harsh environmental conditions caused 
41. [d. at 1243. 
42. [d. 
43. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1244 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 
1983). 
44. A. D~UTSCH. THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 334 (1949). The ancient Spartans 
assumed that disabled children would never contribute to society. Consequently, Greek 
law mandated that such children be killed. 
8
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a premium to be placed on physical stamina. Immigration laws 
excluded persons with disabilities.4Ci Those who were unable to 
support themselves were "farmed out" to households which re-
ceived public assistance for their care. This system was largely 
abandoned in the later 19th century after it was discovered that 
care providers were collecting fees and locking up their charges 
in attics or cellars to starve or freeze to death.46 
In the early 1800s, almshouses were established to house 
disabled persons along with elderly people, juvenile delinquents 
and prostitutes. These facilities were merely custodial and often 
unsanitary and overcrowded.47 In the 1850s, these almshouses 
were replaced by state supervised institutions which provided 
some education and training. The goal of these latter institu-
tions was to enable disabled persons to leave and return to their 
own communities.48 
These facilities were replaced in the later 1800s by institu-
tions which operated under a "benevolent shelter" philosophy to 
protect disabled people from society. These institutions pro-
vided no training, as return to home communities was not a goal. 
Rather, great numbers of disabled persons were permanently 
housed in large warehouses far from population centers.49 
This "protective isolation" model was replaced in the early 
1900s by the notion that it was society that needed protection 
from disabled people. Social Darwinism spawned a eugenics 
movement which asserted that the ills of society were the result 
of physical and mental disabilities, particularly those that were 
hereditary. Persons with disabilities were considered to be "sub-
human creatures" and "waste products," who were a drain on 
45. Frank G. Bowe, Civil Rights Issues of Handicapped Americans Public Policy 
Implications, a consultation sponsored by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, May 
1980. Mental and physical disability are still grounds for denial of immigration to the 
U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976). 
46. Burton, Federal Government Assistance for Disabled Persons: Law and Policy 
in Uncertain Transition, 12 LAW REFORM DISABILITY RIGHTS B5 (1982). 
47. ten Broek and Matson, The Disabled and the Laws of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 
809, 811 (1966). 
48. Wolfensberger, "The Origin of Our Institutional Models," Changing Patterns in 
Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded, Robert B. Kupel and Wolf Wolfen· 
sberger, ed. (Washington, D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1969),65-
66. 
49. Id. at 94-100. 
9
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society and the cause of "pauperism, degeneracy and crime. "110 
Huge custodial institutions were created to isolate persons with 
disabilities, sometimes housing as many as 5,000 to 6,000 people. 
These facilities were vastly underbudgeted.1I1 
By the late 1920s, eugenic theories,1I2 which held that the 
human race was deteriorating genetically, were refuted. The un-
derlying rationale for segregating disabled people from society 
was thus eliminated. Unfortunately, institutionalization as a way 
of reacting to disability was strongly entrenched by then, and 
even today is a prevalent mode of "caring for" persons with 
disabilities.1I3 
The first and second world wars prompted legislation to 
provide vocational rehabilitation programs for returning dis-
abled veterans. In the last ten years, Congress has passed Civil 
Rights laws which seek to guarantee basic civil rights to persons 
with disabilities. II. Passage of such laws, however, cannot quickly 
overcome the effects of exclusion of disabled persons from 
American society since its inception. During the last two hun-
dred years, the evolution of America's architecture, values, heri-
tage, cities, transportation and communication networks, has 
50. Id. at 102, 106-07. See also Burgdorf, Jr. and Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is 
Almost Dead: Buck u. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 
997-1000 (1977). An article calling for a sterilization statute in Kentucky, for example, 
issued the following warning: 
Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have 
been the "cancer of society." Strong, intelligent, useful fami-
lies are becoming smaller and smaller; while irresponsible, dis-
eased, defective families are becoming larger. The result can 
only be race degeneration. To prevent this race suicide we 
must prevent the socially inadequate persons from propagat-
ing their kind, i.e., the feebleminded, epileptic, insane, crimi-
nal, diseased, and others. 
Note, A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky 23 Ky. L.J. 168, 168 (1934). 
51. Some institutions actually competed to see which could reduce costs the most, 
with little concern for the welfare of residents or the quality of their environment. "Farm 
colonies" exploiting the labor of mentally retarded residents became common. See supra 
note 48, at 119-22. 
52. Eugenics advocated several strategies for dealing with the propagation of handi-
capped people. These included prohibitions on marriage and sexual intercourse, compul-
sory sterilization, segregation from community with the opposite sex, and euthanasia. 
Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 998-99. 
53. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, Ct.. 107,40 Stat. 617 (1918). 
54. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act, 20 U.s.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 and Supp. V 1981). 
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taken place without the presence of disabled persons. The barri-
ers which face disabled persons, as they enter society, are 
enormous.66 
Because of this historical isolation of persons with disabili-
ties and the resulting lack of contact with nondisabled people, it 
is not surprising that the latter have limited accurate knowledge 
about disabled people. Sociological and psychological studies 
consistently find that nondisabled persons commonly hold cer-
tain prejudicial attitudes toward disabled people. These atti-
tudes can be reduced to four main categories.66 
The first is the prevailing feeling of discomfort and embar-
rassment on the part of many nondisabled people when in the 
presence of persons with visible handicaps. Such uneasiness may 
reflect deeper fears, the handicap symbolizing universal vulnera-
bility to death, disease and injury. Whatever the cause, disabled 
people encounter the reaction of aversion every day they venture 
out into the world. 67 . 
Patronization and pity are the second category of attitudes 
held toward disabled people. Charitable acts or events such as 
telethons, often make real contributions to disabled people and 
their families. Critics have questioned the motivation of such 
programs, however, and the way they reflect and affect attitudes 
about disability. Such telethons generally depict persons with 
disabilities as permanently helpless, ill, and childlike. Many 
non disabled people often respond according to a perceived moral 
obligation to "help" disabled people, without considering 
whether such help is needed, or in fact may be a hindrance. A 
resulting oversolicitousness toward persons with disabilities de-
nies them expression of personal autonomy. Such "benevolent 
paternalism" reflects an attitude that "such poor, blighted crea-
tures as these must be protected from the world, instead of 
helped to become part of it,6S and that they are less than full 
55. F. BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA (1978). 
56. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF 
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 22-27 (1983). 
57. One disabled writer reported, "I have been served meals in separate dining areas 
of restaurants since, as the owners were quick to point out, I might upset the other 
customers and lessen their enjoyment of the meal." Gitler, Fair Employment and the 
Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 953, 969 n.52 (1978). 
58. SOCIAL AND REHAB. SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
11
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human beings. 
Stereotyping is the third attitude, the label "handicapped" 
conjuring images which have nothing to do with flesh and blood 
individuals. Nondisabled persons generally have false assump-
tions and expectations about persons with disabilities, how they 
should behave, and what their abilities are. One noted psycholo-
gist has selected phrases which graphically identify the unstated 
feelings underlying common stereotypes about disabled people: 
the Subhuman Organism, the Menace, the Unspeakable Object 
of Dread, the Object of Pity, the Holy Innocent, the Diseased 
Organism, the Object of Ridicule, the Eternal Child.1i9 These ste-
reotypes make it difficult for non disabled people to discover a 
disabled person's actual personality. Disabled people are conse-
quently faced with difficulties in overcoming first impressions, in 
establishing common grounds of communication, and in forming 
relationships because they must deal with the "additional bur-
den of eliminating false assumptions about who and what they 
are."60 
The fourth attitude is stigmatization. To be disabled is to 
be different from others in a negative way. This value judgment 
about difference converts disability into a "badge of disgrace."61 
According to many sociologists and educators, the single most 
serious problem for handicapped people is learning to avoid, 
deal with or manage the stigma that confront them.62 
The history of discrimination outlined above, and the prev-
alence of prejudicial attitudes still held today, set the stage for 
the discrimination which faces persons with disabilities in all 
critical areas of life. Public education systems, for example, have 
consistently underserved and undereducated handicapped per-
sons. In 1975, a congressional study found that more than half of 
the eight million disabled children in the U.S. were not receiving 
FARE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED (1969). 
59. WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICE 16-24 
(1972). 
60. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 25. 
61. R. BURGDORF, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS, 49 (1980). "A federal 
court has noted that the stigmatization accompanying some handicaps can be likened to 
a 'sentence of death.' .. Penna. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Penna., 
343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
62. M. EISENBERG, DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS 9-11 (1982). 
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appropriate educational services which would enable them to 
have full equality of opportunity.63 Disabled children, despite re-
cent legislation designated to address this problem, have been 
largely relegated to "separate but equal" special education 
schools, where they typically receive substandard education.6• 
These schools often do not consider serious study to be neces-
sary, because of the presumption that when the children grow 
into disabled adults they can not participate as full members of 
society. Many disabled adults report that as children in special 
education schools, their classes consisted mainly of coloring and 
recess.611 
Overall, disabled people receive much less education than 
their non disabled peers. Fifty-seven percent of disabled adults 
have not finished high school, compared to 23 % of the nondis-
abled population. This disparity widens as one goes up the edu-
cation scale.66 Lack of adequate primary and secondary educa-
tion puts higher education beyond the reach of many disabled 
adults, regardless of intellectual ability. The mechanisms which 
operate to keep disabled persons out of the mainstream of life 
start early, and work effectively to relegate many disabled adults 
to unemployment and poverty. 
Statistical studies show that disabled persons are vastly un-
deremployed. Unemployment rates among disabled workers are 
between fifty and seventy-five percent. Of those who are hired, 
many are channeled into unskilled, low paying positions with 
limited opportunity for advancement.67 Employers hold the 
same stereotypes that other members of the general public do. 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(Supp. IV 1980). 
64. By classifying the child as handicapped and referring him or 
her to a separately financed and organized school bureaucracy, 
schools had legitimized a dual system of education: "regular" 
education for nonhandicapped children and "special" educa-
tion for handicapped or minority ones. The former was sub-
stantially better financed and staffed than the latter which be-
came a classroom of last resort. 
Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Ed., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
65. Interviews with disabled adults who went to special education schools as chil-
dren, Berkeley, California (Feb. 1984). 
66. REHAB. GROUP INC., DIGEST OF DATA ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, Tables 5, 17 
(1979). 
67. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, HANDICAPPED 
RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS, 49 (Apr. 5, 1983). 
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Research shows that employers rank disabled persons below all 
other minority groups as likely to be hired.68 Numerous cases 
illustrate how blanket discrimination excludes disabled persons 
from employment.69 Employer prejudices persist, despite studies 
which show that disabled workers, once hired, perform as well as 
or better than their nondisabled coworkers.70 
Persons with disabilities are denied avenues for expression 
of even the most basic private rights. This is particularly evident 
in the area of family life.71 The California Supreme Court di-
rectly addressed these stereotypes in the case of In re Marriage 
of Carney.72 In that case, a father's custody of two small chil-
dren was challenged by the mother after he became disabled. 
The trial court gave "great weight" to the father's "physical 
handicap and its presumed adverse effect on his capacity to be a 
good father for the boys."73 The court determined that the fa-
ther could not be a fit parent because his disability "prevented a 
normal relationship"7. with the children. Custody was awarded 
to the mother, despite the fact that she had not seen the chil-
dren since the separation five years earlier, and that she was not 
financially able to take responsibility for them. On the other 
hand, testimony showed that the father was financially sound, 
and that he was providing a good home life for the children. 
The California Supreme Court reversed the custody award, 
stating that physical disability was not permissible as "prima fa-
68. Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee and the Handicapped, Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. 629062 (1976). 
69. E.g., Heuman v. Board of Ed. of N.Y., 320 F. Supp. 623 (1970). Plaintiff, after 
receiving her teaching credentials, was denied a license to teach in New York City 
schools on the grounds that being confined to a wheelchair, she was physically and medi-
cally unsuited for teaching. After suit was brought, the Board of Education reversed 
itself and offered plaintiff a license and a teaching position. 
70. Bulletin by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards entitled 
Workmen's Compensation and the Physically Handicapped Worker (1961). Overcom-
pensation in order to counteract low expectations is an example of the heroism, inspira-
tion, or "super-crip" syndrome. See infra note 102. 
71. "Historically, child-custody suits have alqlOst always ended with custody being 
awarded to the non-disabled parent regardless ot whether the affectional or socio-eco-
nomic advantages could have been offered by the disabled parent." 1 VASH, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 155 (1981). 
72. 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979). 
73. [d. at 733, 598 P.2d at 40, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
74. [d. at 735, 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
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cie evidence of a person's unfitness as a parent ."711 The 
court condemned the lower court's stereotyping of the father "as 
a person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply be-
cause he is physically handicapped. Like most stereotypes, this 
is both false and demeaning."7s The Court stated: 
[H]owever limited his bodily strength may be, a 
handicapped parent is a whole person to the child 
who needs his [or her] affection, sympathy, and 
wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up. 
Indeed, in such matter his [or her] handicap may 
well be an asset. Few can pass through the cruci-
ble of a severe disability without learning endur-
ing lessons in patience and tolerance.77 
While the court reached an appropriate result in Carney, this 
case is an exception to the norm. Disabled adults are often dis-
couraged from having children. Involuntary sterilization is still 
common.7S 
In sum, disabled persons are often denied opportunities and 
rights that most nondisabled people take for granted. Additional 
examples include a denial of the right to vote,79 to hold public 
office,B° or to obtain a driver's license.8I Many states restrict the 
right of physically and mentally disabled persons to marry,82 and 
to enter into contracts.83 Disabled persons are denied the right 
to immigrate, and in some cases, to even visit the United 
States.8• Such pervasive discrimination has led many to con-
clude that disabled persons are relegated to "second class 
citizenship. "811 
75. Id. at 736, 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
76. Id. at 737, 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
77. Id. at 739, 598 P.2d at 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
78. Burgdorf and Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 1013-33. Murdock, Sterilization of the 
Retarded: A Problem or a Solution? 62 CAL. L. REV. 921-22 (1974). Verster, Eliminating 
the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer? 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 613, 619 (1966). 
79. Funk, A Disenfranchised People: Disabled Citizens and the Fundamental 
Right to Vote, in LAW REFORM IN DISABILITY RIGHTS, B-I-B-21 (1981). 
80. In re Killeen, 20 N.Y.S. 209 (1923). 
81. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-19 (1972). 
82. Burgdorf and Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 16 SANTA CLARA LAW- . 
YER 861 (1975). 
83. Id. at 861-62. 
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976). R. BURGDORF, supra note 61. 
85. M. EISENBERG, supra note 62. See also Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to 
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The above history of societal stereotyping is relevant be-
cause many of its underlying premises were evident in the 
Bouvia case, both in the media coverage, and in Bouvia's plead-
ings. Such stereotyping might also directly impact other court 
decisions which might involve similar or related issues. 
B. Personification of Negative Stereotypes 
Elizabeth Bouvia's case represented to the public, to her at-
torney, and to a lesser extent, to the court, the negative stereo-
types outlined above. Bouvia's presence in the hospital drew 
considerable media attention, putting her on the evening news 
and in newspapers for months.8s The manner in which the story 
was presented reflected attitudes the general public holds to-
ward disability.s7 The story was typically presented in melodra-
matic or tragic headlines, such as "Fights for Right to Die,"88 
and "Life of Agony."89 
Rather than address the social or political implications of 
the case, this media coverage merely reflected images many 
nondisabled people have about what it would be like to be dis-
abled.90 Society still sees disability as a very unfortunate situa-
tion, in fact, it is often seen as one of the worst things that can 
happen to an individual.9l Society feels sorry for Bouvia, the ge-
neric pity that it feels for all disabled people.92 Acquiring or be-
ing born with a disability is viewed as a "great and enduring 
tragedy, which forever ends the person's chances to enjoy life."93 
86. Peters, Society's Victim, THE DISABILITY RAG 29 (Feb.-March 1984). 
87. Hahn, A Misunderstood Case, THE DISABILITY RAG 9 (Feb.-March 1984). 
88. L.A. Daily Journal, Dec. 8, 1983, at I, col. 9. 
89. Open Forum, ACLU of Southern California, Newsletter, Feb. 1984. 
90. "When you try to talk to a nondisabled reporter and explain what's going on in 
this case it becomes clear most of them don't know what you're trying to say." Hahn, 
supra note 87, at 10. "Used to writing 'in spite or stories about individuals overcoming 
their handicaps, the press is unfamiliar with dealing with disability as an 'issue,' " Pe-
ters, Myth and Media: Where Are Our Voices?, THE DISABILITY RAG, 8, 8 (Feb.-March, 
1984). 
91. Peters, supra note 90, at 29. 
92. "Society still feels sorry for the Elizabeth Bouvias of the world. It is a basic 
emotion that modern, civilized society carries around with it at all times, ready to be 
pressed into service when trying to place Elizabeth Bouvias into some context it can deal 
with. The emotion is pity. Pity has been oppressing, depressing us all our lives." [d. 
93. Weinberg and Williams, How the Physically Disabled Perceive Their Disabili-
ties, 44 JOURNAL OF REHAB. 31 (July, Aug. and Sept. 1978-79). 
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Media coverage of the Bouvia case echoed the feeling on the 
part of many that being disabled is a fate worse than death.94 
These perceptions persist, despite evidence to the contrary. Re-
search findings show that disabled and nondisabled persons gen-
erally rate their lives as equally satisfying.911 When the story first 
appeared, in fact, strong rebuttal was heard from disabled indi-
viduals and groups, protesting the exploitation of irrational fears 
and false stereotypes in the way the story was presented.96 
The language in Bouvia's initial complaint against Riverside 
Hospital illustrates that even to Bouvia's counsel, the case typi-
fies the worst stereotypes about disability. For example, 
throughout pleadings to the superior court,97 such stigmatizing 
language as "horribly affiicted, degrading, incurable,"9s "fulfill-
ment is impossible"99 is used. One can only conclude from this 
language that the briefs merely express counsels' beliefs on the 
subject, beliefs shared by the general public.100 
Even the court falls back upon stereotypes in its decision. It 
encourages Bouvia to live so that "she can be a symbol of hope" 
94. Peters, supra note 86, at 9. 
95. Cameron, Gradinger, Kostin and Kostin, The Life Satisfaction of Nonnormal 
Persons, 41 CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 207, 214 (1973). Research findings do 
not support the notion that persons with disabilities are less happy. Weinberg and Wil-
liams, supra note 93, at 32, conducted a study to elicit the attitudes of disabled persons. 
Responses to a questionnaire showed that 8% of the respondents saw their disability as 
the worst thing that ever happened to them, 11 % as a terrible thing, 19% as a cause of 
frustration, and 60% as an inconvenience or fact of life. Asked whether if given one wish 
they would wish to no longer be disabled, 49% answered yes, 51 % no. Asked whether 
being disabled had any advantages, 49% answered yes, including: opportunity to over-
come a challenge, being more sensitive and tolerant to other people as a result, special 
treatment such as draft exempt status, opportunity to have a wider range of experiences, 
opportunity to meet people from different backgrounds, greater appreciation of life, be-
ing more realistic about life, opportunity to help educate and give hope to other people. 
For a discussion of the discrepancy between expected and actual perception of disability 
of disabled persons, see Wright, Sensitizing Outsiders to the Position of the Insider, 22 
REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 136-41 (1973). 
96. Disabled people who have been trying to get their voices heard in the Bouvia 
case are doing it because they feel the issue has been terribly misunderstood by the 
media. Peters, supra note 90. See also Hahn, supra note 86. 
97. Points and Authorities for plaintiff, supra note 9. 
98. Id. at 14, 16, 20. 
99. Id. at 10 (citing In re Brooks Estate, 32, Ill.2d 361 (1965». 
100. "It is even pity perhaps, that makes attorney and physician Richard Scott, in a 
peculiarly ignorant defense, note that 'quadraplegics can't work.' It is, perhaps, pity that 
inspired the ACLU of Southern California to take the case." Wyman, Rainbow to Power, 
THE DISABILITY RAG, 28, 29 (Feb.-March 1984). 
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to other disabled people. IOI This expectation of heroismlo2 is the 
flip side of pity, and puts equivalent limitations on what a dis-
abled person can be, expecting superhuman qualities, rather 
than subhuman ones. I03 
C. Judicial Stamp of Approval 
It is crucial that the court not put its judicial stamp of ap-
proval on negative stereotypes about disability. This would re-
sult if it were to allow the state to assist an individual to die 
only because he or she has a disability. Judicial decisions which 
are based upon societal prejudices merely reinforce those 
prejudices, making them even more difficult to eradicate. lo4 
Courts have in the past sanctioned the segregation and exclusion 
of disabled persons. lOCI It is only in the last two decades that this 
101. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1247 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 
1983). 
102. The same thought was expressed by Riverside Hospital psychiatrist Donald 
Fisher, who said that "her life could become an example of heroism to others," and that 
she ought to be proud of how much she has overcome in getting her degree and getting 
to live on her own. Peters, in the DISABILITY RAG notes, "Fisher speaks for society. In his 
suggestion lies much of Bouvia's problem. Society expects heroism of her, and she 
doesn't want to deliver." Peters, supra note 86, at 28. 
103. Society recognizes the reality of a disabled person's life as her-
oism, the achievement of a lifestyle as overcoming adversity. 
And society is right. It is right not because living disabled is 
anything that in itself should be heroic. It's right because soci-
ety has not changed despite what we tell ourselves. 
[d. at 29. 
104. Often cited as a case in which judicial decision was based upon stereotypes, and 
which reinforced those stereotypes, is Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of an Oregon statute which limited the number of hours women 
could work in a given day, the court reasoned "woman has always been dependent upon 
man ... [because of his) superior strength .... As minors, ... she has been looked 
upon in the courts as needing especial care . . . . In the struggle for subsistence she is 
not an equal competitor with her' brother." [d. at 421, 422. This stereotype of women as 
childlike and in need of protection is analogous to the perception that persons with disa-
bilities are perpetual children. Contrast this with a judicial decision which sought to 
address the effects of a long history of racial discrimination, Grigs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971). "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." [d. at 431. This 
interpretation and conclusion is analogous to the intent of Congress in enacting disabil-
ity civil rights legislation. See supra note 11 & 84. 
105. E.g., "For the feeble-minded and epileptics are not the only persons in the 
community whose elimination as undesirable citizens would, or might in the judgment of 
the Legislature, be a distinct benefit to society." Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-
Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, _, 88 A. 963, 966 (1913). 
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approach has been altered with the passage of disability civil 
rights legislation. loe 
Legislators have made clear their intent regarding the direc-
tion of public policy toward persons with disabilities. Both the 
state and federal governments now pursue the commendable 
goal of total integration of handicapped persons into the main-
stream of society. The legislature declares that "It is the policy 
of this state to encourage and enable disabled persons to partici-
pate fully in the social and economic life of the state .... "107 
By enacting disability civil rights statutes in so many sub-
stantive and administrative areas,IOe legislators have shown a 
Merritt has been a crippled and defective child since his birth, 
being afflicted with a form of paralysis which affects his whole 
physical and nervous make-up .... It appears that he is nor-
mal mentally, and that he kept pace with the other 
pupils .... [However,l the right of a child ... to attend the 
public schools ... cannot be insisted upon when its [sicl pres-
ence therein is harmful to the best interests of the school. 
This, like other individual rights, must be subordinated to the 
general welfare. 
Beattie v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 232, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (1919). But 
cf., Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 598 P.2d 36 (1979) in which the court 
explicitly rejected lower court reasoning that a disabled parent could not have a "nor-
mal" relationship with his [or herl children. "Such stereotypes have no place in our law." 
[d. at 725, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 598 P.2d at 36. 
106. Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11135, § 
19230(a) (West 1976). 
107. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 19230(a) (West 1976). 
108. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 19000 (declares policy of rehabilitation for 
employment); CAL. GOV'T CODE 11135 (bars discrimination against handicapped in state-
funded programs); [d. § 19230 et seq. (requires affirmative action programs for handi-
capped employment by state agencies); [d. § 19702 (bars discrimination in state civil 
service); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420 (West 1973) (bars discrimination by private employers or 
labor unions); [d. § 1735 bars discrimination in employment on public works; CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 54, 54.1 (West 1968) (guarantees access to public transportation, public accom-
modations, and rented housing); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56700 et seq. (creates special educa-
tional program for physically handicapped students); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 126.6 
(West 1974) (bars discrimination by holders of professional licenses); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 
4450 et seq. (West 1968) (requires handicapped access to buildings and facilities con-
structed with public funds); CAL. HEALTH & SAP. CODE § 19955 et seq. (access to private 
buildings open to the general public); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5070.5(c) (West 1974) (ac-
cess to public recreational trails); see also CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 22507.8, 22511.5 et seq. 
(West 1970) (special parking privileges for handicapped drivers). Similar legislation has 
been enacted on the federal level. (See, e.g., Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4151-4157 (1968) (requires handicapped access to public buildings constructed, leased, or 
financed by the federal government); Rehabilitation Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 792 (1973) 
(creates Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to ensure compli-
19
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clear trend away from negative stereotyping and discrimination. 
Treatment of persons with disabilities is to follow the intent of 
Civil Rights Statutes such as section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.109 Thus, the courts have clear guidance as to what 
public policy toward persons with disabilities is to be. The court 
would be acting contrary to this policy if it were to sanction 
plaintiff's arguments. Such a sanction would be putting a judi-
cial stamp of approval on the negative stereotyping those argu-
ments reflect. 
D. Prohibitions Against Assisting a Person to Commit 
Suicide 
1. Policy 
Suicide is not and has never been a crime in California.llo 
However, anyone who "deliberately aids, or encourages, or ad-
vises another to commit suicide," is guilty of a felony.l11 Policy 
considerations underlying this prohibition recognize the possibil-
ity of mistake, accident, or abuse in such circumstances. Since 
the person who is assisted is not later available for questioning, 
there is no way to determine whether the suicide was genuine, or 
whether elements of accident or duress were involved. 
2. Exception to Policy and Possible Abuse 
The policy considerations which underly prohibitions 
against assisting suicide are equally relevant to disabled and 
nondisabled persons. To make an exception to these prohibi-
tions on the basis of disability would open the doors to possible 
abuse. Since many people believe it is not possible for a disabled 
person to have a good life, removing liability in cases where the 
assistee is disabled would make it too easy for people to act on 
those assumptions, rationalizing that they were doing the "kind 
ance with Architectural Barriers Act and promote removal of "architectural, transporta-
tion, and attitudinal barriers confronting handicapped individuals"); Urban Mass Trans-
portation Assistance Act § 8, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970) (declares federal policy that mass 
transit systems be designed for access by handicapped); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 609 (1978) 
(regulations concerning access to major transit systems receiving federal financial 
assistance). 
109. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
110. Tate v. Caonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960). 
111. [d. at 903, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1970). 
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thing." 
Society in large part rejects life as a disabled person.Il2 Pub-
lication of Bouvia's story, consciously or unconsciously, triggered 
in the public mind a common reaction that "if I were in that 
position, I'd want to die too."ll3 "Widespread public support for 
early detection and abortion of physically defective infants [sic] 
is also indicative of the belief that the disabled have less of a 
chance for the good life."114 Recent Baby Doe cases have 
brought to public attention a pervasive practice of withholding 
medical care to newborn infants with birth defects, resulting in 
their death. lUI This practice often exists because "families of de-
formed infants ... [fear] that they and their other children 
[will] become socially enslaved, economically deprived, and per-
manently stigmatized. "118 
The arguments used for mercy killing of disabled infants 
and disabled adults are the same. "It is a very short step from 
the right to die to a duty to die. Behind all of it is society's belief 
that disabled people have a duty to die."ll7 Many disabled per-
sons housed in institutions are already subject to widespread 
abuse, including dangerous physical conditions, sexual abuse, 
gross understaffing, and medical experimentation.lI8 In such set-
tings, persons who express dissatisfaction with their life situa-
tion may be interpreted as expressing a desire to commit suicide. 
They are more likely to be assisted if no liability were attached. 
112. "We know society rejects life 88 a disabled person. We either know that or we 
are fools, lying to ourselves." Peters, supra note 86, at 3. 
113. Id. at 9. 
114. Weinberg and Williams, supra note 93, at 31. 
115. For a discussion of withholding of medical services to infants with disabilities, 
see Amicus Brief of Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, American Academy 
of Pediatrics v. Margaret Heckler, Sec. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Services, Civ. No. 
83-0774. "Section 504 requires that medical standards be applied equitably ... that 
medical services not be denied solely because a person is handicapped." Amicus Brief at 
2. 
116. Duff and Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 
289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973). 
117. Peters, supra note 86, at 10. Others have obserVtld that the issues would have 
been presented differently if the Baby Jane Doe suit had been filed by an attorney or 
pediatrician with spina bifida (Baby Doe's disability). "I can't help but believe public 
debate would have had a different ring." Johnson, The Right is the Wrong Group to 
Plead Our Rights in THE DISABILITY RAG 11, 11 (Feb.-March 1984). 
118. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250-58 (1973). 
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If a disabled person has expressed a serious intention to 
commit suicide but begins to vacillate, the "helper" may not be 
inclined to hear or take seriously a change of mind. He or she 
may go ahead and assist despite the disabled person's hesitation, 
believing that a meaningful life is not possible for that person. 
These are some of the possibilities for mistakes or coercion 
which penal sanctions were intended to prevent. 
Counselors in the area of substance abuse by disabled per-
sons report that there are always physicians in the community 
who overprescribe pain and sleep medications and tranquilizers 
for their patients who have disabilities. ll9 These doctors proba-
bly do so from a sense of frustration that "nothing more can be 
done" for that person, or that he or she must be in a great deal 
of psychological pain which must be relieved. A great number of 
disabled people are subject to such circumstantial addiction. 
The drugs involved can often be lethal if taken in the wrong 
dosage or combination. 
Newly disabled persons would also be vulnerable. It is likely 
that there would be people around them who would believe they 
would want to die if they would become disabled. If no liability 
were attached, the latter might offer the disabled person "a way 
out," so that she or he "wouldn't have to live that way" or "be a 
burden to his or her family."120 With the availability of such as-
sistance, many newly disabled persons might commit suicide 
who would otherwise not do so. Given the low status ascribed to 
persons with disabilities and the considerable difficulties inher-
ent in many disabling conditions, suicide is a serious option. A 
newly disabled person, however, should have the opportunity to 
find out what life is like for him or her as a disabled person. The 
most reasonable choice can only be made from the vantage point 
of experience, after exposure to different aspects of disability. 
This is the kind of opportunity for in-depth consideration, free 
from interference, which penal sanctions were intended to 
119. Interview with former substance abuse counseling staff, Center for Independent 
Living, Berkeley, California (Feb. 1984). 
120. "Discrimination on the basis of handicap ... often occurs under the guise of 
extending a helping hand or a mistaken restrictive belief as to the limitations of handi-
capped persons." Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th 
Cir. 1981). Such a benevolent or helping hand approach was rejected by the court in 
Pushkin in which plaintiff was denied admission to the University's residency program 
because he had multiple sclerosis and used a wheelchair. [d. at 1372, 1383. 
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protect. 
3. Drawing the Line 
Because of the existence of negative stereotypes, it would be 
difficult to draw the line in determining who is or is not able to 
commit suicide without assistance. Bouvia requested assistance 
from the state because she asserted that she was physically una-
ble to commit suicide without it. Persons who use wheelchairs 
are often viewed as requiring help to do virtually everything, 
even though this is rarely the case.121 It is common knowledge in 
the disabled community that persons more severely disabled 
than Bouvia can and do commit suicide in a variety of ways if 
they so desire. 122 Hence, the factual finding by the court that 
Bouvia was unable to commit suicide unassisted was based on 
false stereotypes and was erroneous. Because of this inherent 
difficulty in determining ability to commit suicide, it is inevita-
ble that courts would sometimes reach enormous conclusions. 
This would bypass safeguards against mistake or accident in-
tended by the Code. 
4. Disability and Disease 
Stereotypical attitudes tend to reflect confusion about disa-
bility and disease, promoting the possibility of abuse or mistake. 
Persons with disabilities are often seen as being ill, their physi-
cal difference a sign of sickness or disease.123 People who use 
wheelchairs are often referred to as "patients," when in fact they 
may not have seen a doctor or the inside of a hospital in years. 
This lumping together of disability and disease is illustrated by 
the American Civil Liberty Union's (ACLU) policy on euthana-
sia.1u In it, the ACLU maintains "assistance in the act of con-
sensual euthanasia is not illegal," when requested by individuals 
121. Society believes disabled people ought to be dependent. To be disabled is to be 
dependent by nature. To allow vast changes in the way disabled people live would shake 
the very foundations of this belief." Rosen, Dependency, in THE DISABILITY RAG 23 
(Feb.-March 1984). 
122. Interview with former counseling staff, Center for Independent Living, Berke-
ley, California (Feb. 1984). 
123. Hahn, supra note 87, at 10. 
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who are either "terminally ill or totally and permanently dis-
abled."1211 Thus, two very different and distinct states are 
lumped together and referred to as if they were analagous. 
ACLU policy does not reflect an awareness that illness and disa-
bility involve very different issues in terms of health, access, so-
cietal attitudes and expected longevity.126 
Disability and illness are not synonymous, though they may 
overlap. Many disabilities are stable, and once acquired do not 
in themselves prevent the individual from enjoying good health 
and a normal life span. Examples of such disabilities include 
post-poliomyelitis (polio), cerebral palsy, spinal cord injuries, 
blindness and deafness. Other disabilities, such as multiple scle-
rosis and muscular dystrophy, are progressive in nature and 
may, in fact, shorten life span and severely affect health. 
Counsel for Bouvia confused disability and terminal illness 
in their arguments. They claimed that her disability is terminal, 
and that because she requires assistance in eating most foods 
her actions would not constitute suicide.127 The rationale being 
that without such assistance Bouvia's disability would naturally 
result in her death by starvation. Counsel further asserted that 
feeding Bouvia necessarily constituted medical treatment as de-
fined in Cobbs. us 
Counsel for Bouvia misinterpreted the issues presented in 
this case. Bouvia has cerebral palsy, a disability which falls into 
the nonprogressive category. Cerebral palsy is not an illness and 
it is not terminal; it does not require medical treatment to pro-
long life. It is a disability which is relatively stable and which, in 
Bouvia's case, necessitates that in eating most foods, someone 
other than Bouvia, bring the food from plate to mouth. Bringing 
125. 1d. at 256, 257. 
126. Some observers feel this failure on the part of the ACLU to distinguish disabil-
ity and illness was based on societal attitudes that "If I were in that position, I'd want to 
die too," and in fact this attitude "motivated the ACLU to take the case." Hahn, supra 
note 87, at 10. Referring to the joined policy re disability 'lnd terminal illness: When we 
discovered that we were very upset. Of course, a lot of people seem to think of the two as 
being in similar categories. The case simply reflects what society thinks disability is," 
Hahn, supra note S7, at 9, 10. 
127. Points and Authorities for plaintiff. Bouvia v. Riverside No. 159780 at 8-36 
(Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 16, 19S3). 
128. 8 Cal. App. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). 
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food to mouth is not medical treatment. It does not require any 
special medical training or licensing. Eating is a natural life 
activity. 
As the superior court noted in its decision, all of Bouvia's 
bodily systems were fully functional and she was not ill or termi-
nal.129 The act of suicide involves a decision to end a life that 
would otherwise continue. Bouvia's decision to stop eating was 
specifically intended to result in death by starvation. As such, it 
constituted an intent to commit suicide.130 While the Bouvia 
court correctly separated the conditions, the possibility that 
other courts would confuse disability with terminal illness is 
great. This is the kind of possibility for mistake that penal sanc-
tions were intended to prevent. 
5. Denial of Granting Exception to Penal Sanctions 
As discussed above, research shows that negative assump-
tions about the quality of life of disabled people are deeply en-
trenched in society. Many institutions in which disabled persons 
are housed are understaffed and underfunded, and abuse against 
those institutionalized is still a problem. It is difficult, and in 
most cases impossible, to draw the line in determining who is or 
is not able to commit suicide without assistance. The general 
public tends to confuse disability with disease and assumes that 
all persons with disabilities are ill. 
These attitudes and problems would leave the door open for 
abuse if penal sanctions against assisting suicide were removed 
when the person being assisted is disabled. The superior court 
may have recognized this possibility in its decision. In denying 
Bouvia's request for injunctive relief, it recognized the overrid-
ing interests of similarly situated persons, stating that "her 
death under these circumstances would have a profound effect 
on other similarly situated disabled persons. "t3l The court may 
have realized that to grant such a request would set a precedent 
dangerous to disabled people in general. 
129. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1242, 1243 (Super Ct. Riverside filed Dec. 
16, 1983). 
130. [d. at 1245. 
131. [d. at 1240. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF SECTION 504 OF REHABILI~A­
TION ACT OF 1973 
Section 504132 is a Civil Rights Statute, enacted to reverse 
the effects of a history of discrimination and segregation, and to 
eliminate attitudinal and physical barriers to full and equal par-
ticipation in society.133 Its language was patterned after, and is 
almost identical to that in Title VI and Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Section 504 reads in pertinent part: "No oth-
erwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States 
. . . shall, solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subject to 
discrimination under any program or activity, receiving. Federal 
financial assistance. "134 
Section 504 was intended to include disability within the 
general body of Federal anti-discrimination law. The underlying 
theme for all measures which it mandates is "integrationist."1311 
Under section 504, the results of two hundred years of attitudi-
nal and architectural barriers are to be examined, with the goals 
of taking steps to remove such barriers.136 Thus, public buildings 
are now generally required to be ramped and to have accessible 
bathrooms, printed materials available to the public are to be 
made available in braille for blind persons, public meetings are 
to be accompanied by sign language interpreters in order to be 
accessible to deaf persons, and so on.137 
132. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
133. Brief of Amici Curiae, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Berkeley 
Califorinia, to Supreme Court, Consolidated Rail v. LeStrange, No. 82-862 at 7-11 (Oct. 
1984). 
134. 29 U.S.C. § 794. This language, similar to that in Title VII, was a result of an 
awareness on the part of Congress that disabled persons face prejudice and stereotyping 
very much like that directed at women and other minorities. 
135. Amicus Brief, LeStrange, supra note 133, at 8, "integrationist," i.e., to integrate 
disabled persons into the mainstream of life rather than to segregate. 
136. "The time has come to firmly establish the right of these Americans to dignity 
and self-respect as equal and contributing members of society and to end the virtual 
isolation of millions of children and adults from society." 118 CONGo REc. § 32310 (Sept. 
26, 1972) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey). 
137. "Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped in-
dividuals, ... in relation to federal assistance with employment, housing, transporta-
tion, education, health services, among other federally-aided programs." S. Rep. No. 
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38. 
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Section 504 was a direct challenge to traditional notions and 
stereotypes about disability.13B The historical approach to disa-
bility, as outlined above, has been to segregate and exclude dis-
abled persons from the rest of society. Section 504, on the other 
hand, was intended to remove discriminatory practices and 
thereby enable persons with disabilities to participate in all ar-
eas of society.139 The statute also provides that, in some cases, 
reasonable accommodation and auxiliary services may be neces-
sary to provide opportunity for full and equal participation. 
Bouvia requested auxiliary services in the form of pain medica-
tion and hygienic care. The following case illustrate examples of 
auxiliary services and reasonable accommodation intended 
under section 504. 
The removal of a discriminatory practice and provision of 
reasonable accommodation were illustrated in Coleman v. Casey 
Bd. of Ed. 140 In that case, a single leg amputee was denied em-
ployment as a bus driver under a state regulation which prohib-
ited persons without two legs from driving buses. The court held 
this regulation to violate section 504, as there was no evidence to 
indicate that two legs were necessary to drive a bus safely. The 
court further found that plaintiff was qualified to drive a bus, 
and was not hindered in any way from doing so because he had 
one leg. All that was necessary to drive the bus was a hand 
clutch, which the court determined to be a reasonable accommo-
dation to his disability. 
Provision of auxiliary services to afford equal access was ad-
dressed in Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehab. Services. l4l In that 
case, a deaf student requested that the services of a sign lan-
guage interpreter be provided so he could attend and benefit 
from university classes. While no policy prohibited this student 
from attending the university because he was deaf, he could not 
benefit from instruction without the services of a sign language 
interpreter. The court determined an interpreter should be pro-
138. Amicus Brief, to Supreme Court, consolidated Rail v LeStrange, No. 82-862 at 
7-11 (Oct. 1984). 
139. Section 504 "confirms the federal interest in developing the opportunities for 
all individuals with handicaps to live full and independent lives." Community Television 
of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508 (1983). 
140. 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980). 
141. 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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vided so the student could have true access to university 
instruction. 
Bouvia sought services under section 504 which were alto-
gether different from those illustrated by the cases above. She 
did not request removal of a discriminatory practice, or auxiliary 
services which would provide her with access. Section 504 man-
dates equal access for disabled persons to programs or services 
which are available to everyone, sometimes requiring auxiliary 
aids to reach that result. Riverside Hospital does not have a pro-
gram to assist persons to commit suicide. If it did, Riverside 
would have to ensure that the benefits of that program were 
available to disabled and non-disabled persons alike. Persons 
who could not take advantage of the program because they were 
disabled could reasonably request auxiliary services to enable 
them to have access to the program. 
Bouvia's request that Riverside provide her with care when 
she is in stable health and wishes to die voluntarily is not a re-
quest for aid to ensure equal access, since no such program ex-
ists. Section 504 does not mandate access to programs not avail-
able to anyone else. Hence, the auxiliary services which she 
requests because of her disability do not fall within the scope of 
section 504. 
It is clear from the requested application of section 504 that 
counsel misconstrued the underlying purpose of that statute. 
Section 504 was intended to aid in the removal of prejudices and 
barriers. Counsels' arguments reflected the very stereotypes 
sought to be eliminated under the statute. If the court had 
adopted those arguments, it would have reinforced those 
prejudices and barriers. Such a result would have been in direct 
opposition to the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. 
Bouvia did not cite section 504 to provide her with full and 
equal access to areas of life from which disabled persons have 
traditionally been excluded. Consequently, section 504 is not 
properly applied to the facts of the case.142 
142. "The argument that a disabled person has a right to [this kind of assistance] is 
a distortion of the things the disability rights movement stands for." Longmore, in THE 
DISABILITY RAG 10, (Feb.-March 1984). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Elizabeth Bouvia's case presented unique legal questions. 
She argued that penal sanctions designed to protect the general 
public discriminate against her because she is disabled. She 
wished to apply a statute that is designed to facilitate entry into 
life, to facilitate her exit from life. Her statements to the press 
graphically described the very real personal hardships associated 
with her disability.143 The reasons for her request should not be 
ignored. However, the manner in which her case was presented 
showed no awareness of the societal inequities which mayor 
may not have played a role in her decision.144 State sanctioned 
death has long been an assumption for persons with disabili-
ties.14I! It is the right to exist which has not been fully recog-
nized.146 It is the reality of those external forces which make her 
interpretation of the statute dangerous to disabled people in 
general.147 In rejecting Bouvia's arguments, the court recognized 
that if it were to grant Bouvia's request, its decision "would 
have an adverse effect on other similarly situated handicapped 
persons. "148 
Belinda Stradley* 
143. For statement by Elizabeth Bouvia, see RAG, supra note 86, at 5 entitled "I am 
fully aware ... " 
144. I remember watching a goose trapped in the space between 
two farm buildings. A barking dog was terrifying it. There was 
enough space for it to have escaped, but it seemed totally oc-
cupied in avoiding the sharp teeth of its very present threat. It 
could have turned and retreated. But it was hypnotized by the 
confusion caused by the threat to its integrity. Somehow that 
poor goose keeps coming to my mind as I read the bizarre de-
tails of Bouvia's travail. What can we do, other than to grieve 
with her that society has not prepared a good place for us to 
flourish, and to help her overcome the weariness in the strug-
gle to endure. 
Owen, The Goose Girl; The Right to Die, in THE DISABILITY RAG 4 (Feb.-March, 1984). 
145. Interview with Arlene Mayerson, staff attorney for the Disability Rights Educa-
tion and Defense Fund, Berkeley, California (Feb. 1984). 
146. [d. 
147. "If she got the court ruling she's asking for ... that would be a precedent 
endangering all other disabled people." Hahn, supra note 87, at 10. 
148. Bouvia v. Riverside, No. 159780 at 1243 (Super. Ct. Riverside tiled Dec. 16, 
1983). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1985. 
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